To those who labor under the
misconception that Fidel Castro’s regime was incapable of
maintaining a
secret pipeline to a Lee Oswald, or not inclined to authorize
and/or
condone assassinations, an overview of Castro’s spy agencies
might
prove instructive. Traditionally, it has been infinitely
easier to
obtain operational details and internal structural layouts for
the
offices of America’s secret warriors than for those of its
intelligence
adversaries. This is especially true for Cuba’s spy apparatus.
Given
the relative transparency of the US government, thousands of
books and
monographs have been written on CIA, FBI, NSA, Military
Intelligence,
etc. But for those seeking to determine if Cuba’s spooks were
prone to
instigate (or even condone, as in the Kennedy case) foreign
assassinations, it has been near impossible to get answers.
However,
when one pieces together testimony, CIA debriefs, and
interviews from
Cuba’s spy defectors, some very close to the top of its
bureaucracy, a
consistent and far different picture emerges of Cuba’s intel
modus
operandi than most would assume.
The New York Times called Cuba's
intelligence
apparatus the “Little Spy Engine That Could.” Indeed,
far from
being the undersized counterintelligence force that is
commonly
perceived for the diminutive nation, Cuba’s secret services
are
surprisingly aggressive and proactive. In fact, despite its
weak
economy and small size, the island nation boasts an
intelligence arm
that, relatively speaking, is much larger than that of the
United
States, with wide-ranging clandestine operations ongoing
throughout the
globe. The only small nation that even comes close to Cuba’s
spycraft
intensity is Israel.
When Juan Antonio Rodriguez Menier, one of
the
highest ranked Cuban intelligence officers, and a founding
member of
Cuba’s G2 spy agency, defected to the US in 1987, he brought
with him a
wealth of information on the history and deepest secrets of
Cuban
intelligence services. (See his bio in footnote*)
Through
interviews with him by the authors, as well as the procurement
of his
lengthy unpublished manuscripts which he also provided to the
CIA, we
at last have a window into the innermost workings and agendas
of the
Kennedy brothers’ dangerous adversaries. Other Cuban
intelligence
defectors, such as Ricardo Morales, Vladimir Rodriguez Lahera,
Gerardo
Peraza, Jesus Raúl Perez Mendez, Major Florentino Aspillaga
Lombard, Domingo Amuchastegui, Manuel De Beunza, Rafael del
Pino, and
Jose Cohen have helped us fill in even more details. What
follows is
the combined knowledge gleaned from these sources, as well as
scholars
such as Frank O. Mora, Antonio de la Cova, William Ratliff,
Brian
Latell (CIA’s Cuban expert), Stuart Hoyt (FBI’s Cuban expert),
Claire
Sterling, Rex Hudson, and others. Fabian Escalante Font, a
longtime
Cuban intelligence senior officer, is perhaps the only current
Cuban
official to have written on the subject, and his books,
although mired
in propaganda, have also given up a few structural details.
All told,
these sources describe a complex setup, with many branches
(often
overlapping), mergers, and name changes over the years.
----------------------------------
* Rodriguez Menier joined
Castro's
26th of July Movement in Havana in 1954 and from 1956, when
Castro
arrived in the Sierra Maestra from Mexico, he collected
money,
medicine, weapons, clothing, and information for Castro for
the
guerrilla forces. In May 1959 Rodríguez Menier joined
the
Directorate of Information of the Rebel Army (DIER), later
known as the
G2. Over the decades that followed, he was involved in acts
of
penetration, recruiting for the incipient Cuban Intelligence
service
(known as M) and debriefing for the Department of State
Security (DSE).
Later he served as an Intelligence Officer, Department Head
of the
General Directorate of the National Revolutionary Police and
Second
Head of the Center of Intelligence of Cuba in Budapest,
Hungary. From
1970 until 1985 he produced 15 secret TV documentaries at
the request
of Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, Ramiro Valdés
Menéndez and José Abrantes. In 1982 Rodríguez
Menier was reassigned abroad, at the Cuban Intelligence
Center in East
Germany, as a DGI official. In February 1987, after eleven
years trying
to make the deal, he finally obtained political asylum in
the United
States with his family.
---------------------------------
1. EARLY HISTORY
On August 22, 1958, while still organizing in the Cuban
countryside,
Army Commander Raúl Castro and Captain Abelardo Colomé
Ibarra (war name “Furry”) signed a decree establishing the
Basic
Intelligence Service (SIB). As part of the new
infrastructure,
Fidel Castro assigned then Captain Ramiro Valdés
Menéndez, an alumus of the Granma expedition, to form and
direct
a small secret organization within the Rebel Army, citing
three
specific goals for the new cadre: to uncover the revolutionary
fighters
who were passing on information to the police or army of
Batista; to
detect those rebels who were likely to be recruited by the
police or
army of Batista; and to penetrate the ranks of the police and
army of
Batista in order to gather information about the plans of the
government and to try to influence them. Simultaneously, Fidel
instructed his brother Raúl to open the Western Second Front,
which he did, in the Sierra Maestra Mountains, placing Captain
Manuel
"Barba Roja” (Red Beard) Piñeiro Lozada in charge. Born in
Matanzas, the son of a Bacardi executive, Piñeiro had left his
business studies at Columbia University early to join the 1959
Cuban
Revolution.
In Sierra Maestra, Fidel and Raúl instructed Piñeiro to
create still another organization, the National Revolutionary
Police, a
public branch of the secret intelligence organization, capable
of
preventing, controlling, and neutralizing any future actions
against
Cuba by the CIA and other enemy special services. From then
on,
Piñeiro served as Castro's dirty operations man for the
Western
Hemisphere, personally setting up and directing Cuba's
assassination,
kidnapping, and terror international in the region.
On January 10, 1959, less than two weeks after the Castro
brothers’
revolutionary victory, Fidel appointed Valdés head of the
Department of Intelligence of the Rebel Army (Departamento de
Inteligencia del Ejercito Rebelde, or DIER), which now
colloquially
used the “G2” moniker that had been coined in the United
States.
Piñeiro was appointed general inspector of the Department of
Operations, and, with Valdés, opened temporary G2 headquarters
in a pavilion at the Military Hospital of Colombia in
Havana.
Soon, however, Valdés moved his headquarters to an immense
residence located at the end of Fifth Avenue in the Miramar
district
where the road to Jaimanitas Beach begins. The new
headquarters was
called “The Directorate,” and had a staff of about 30
officials and
functionaries. Importantly, the G2 was always
politically and
militarily subordinate to the Castro brothers.
--------------------------------
+ G2 is now a generic
intelligence
term, first coined by US General John J. Pershing in 1917 to
denote a
division level Army intelligence officer. S2 was used to
denote
intelligence officers at the regiment level.
--------------------------------
On March 26, 1959, the Intelligence
Information
Department of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (DIIFAR) was
formed as a
prelude to the founding, in October 1959, of the Ministry of
the
Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR - the Cuban “CIA”) and the
Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MINREX), with Raúl placed in charge of
both.
MINFAR named Ibarra as Vice Minister of Counterintelligence
and
Intelligence. Ibarra’s department was and is tasked with
gathering
intelligence abroad through military attachés, using contacts
and agents. It also oversees the personal security of Raúl
Castro. Fidel 's safety is guaranteed by the General
Directorate of
Personal Security (DGSP), one of the elite organizations of
the Cuban
state. The “Section on Life-Attempts” of the DGSP is in charge
of
gathering all information relating to an actual or suspected
attempt on
the life of Fidel Castro, regardless of how insignificant or
improbable
it may seem. This includes checking everything Fidel
eats,
drinks, wears and uses, and having his favorite foreign beers
shipped
by diplomatic courier directly to Fidel (the “Supplies”
section). The
section is subdivided into bureaus that handle supplies of
different
kinds. The Section on Motor Vehicles is responsible for the
cars and
trucks Fidel Castro uses on the road and it includes an
extensive
repair shop.
In addition, the
Section on
Life-Attempts gathers all information relating to an actual or
suspected attempt on the life of Castro, regardless of how
insignificant or improbable it may seem. In stark contrast to
other
branches of the MININT, this section moves quickly and
decisively. The
section's officers, who bypass normal bureaucracies to move
quickly and
decisively, have explicit orders to take no chances; its motto
is "a
bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." The officers are
trained at
a large facility called “Maby,” where only people whose work
is related
to this section are allowed to visit.
The
Training School
Within a year of these agencies’ origins, young recruits from
DSE,
MINFAR, and MINREX were being dispatched to the Soviet Union
for
advanced training. According to the US Army Intelligence’s
2002 FOIA
release on the history of Cuban Intelligence, Jose Abrantes,
the
personal assistant to Ramiro Valdés had gone to the USSR to
take
a special course of instructions. In his book, Executive
Action, Fabian
Escalante said that he was among those sent to the USSR.
According to a number of well-placed sources, one of the key
schools
for the young Cuban agents was located in Minsk, Russia, where
another
Castro supporter, Lee Oswald, was living out his
Hemingway-esque
adventure. The school was located on Ulyanova Street, run by
one Col.
Ilya Vasilyevich Prusakov, an MVD [Ministry of Internal
Affairs]
engineer, and one of the most privileged people in
Minsk. Note
that the KGB (Soviet Internal Security) was a subsidiary of
the MVD.
Note also that Prusakov was the uncle of Lee Oswald’s
soon-to-be
Russian bride, Marina Prusakova. Gerald Patrick Hemming, an
American
Marine and Cuban rebel supporter who “ran guns” from the US to
the
Sierra Maestra forces from 1958 to 1960, learned about the
Minsk
facility while in the mountains with the Castros.
“Starting in 1960, Ramiro Valdés’ people began going to the
Soviet bloc for training,” Hemming recalled shortly before his
death.
“The youngest rebels went to Minsk – I was scheduled to go
myself – to
the MVD Academy there. They would go to Minsk first, then on
to GRU or
STASI facilities in Prague and elsewhere.” Recall from the
narrative
that, according to both KGB and G2 sources, Valdés received
the
Russians’ Oswald Minsk file in Havana in 1962. According to
former
Cuban diplomat Rafael Nunez, among those training in Minsk was
Fabian
Escalante, who worked directly under Valdés at the time.
Hemming
concurs: “Fabian Escalante definitely went to Minsk.” Upon his
return
from Russia, Escalante was sent to Costa Rica on a secret
mission to
spy on the exiles who were prepping there for the upcoming Bay
of Pigs
invasion.
According to a 1963 CIA memo, a Soviet
defector
debriefed in London in 1950 told the Agency that the Minsk
school was
founded in 1947, and had an enrollment of approximately 200
students at
the time. A 1968 Soviet defector, a Minsk engineer, also
informed
the CIA (and later author Edward Jay Epstein) that the school
was well
known to Minsk residents because of its one-way windows and
the high
stone wall that shielded it.
G2 officer Gerado Peraza joined Fidel
Castro's rebel
forces in the Sierra Maestra. In early January 1959,
having
reached the rank of second lieutenant in the Revolutionary
Army, Peraza
returned to Havana, and, after spending a few months as a
policeman,
joined the G2 security service after being trained in the
USSR. In
1982, after his defection to the US, he testified in closed
session
before a US Senate subcommittee and also spoke of the Cuban
training in
the USSR:
The
training in the Soviet Union was based primarily in the
knowledge of
the Central Intelligence Agency and the other
organizations of
intelligence in the United States, the different working
methods of the
FBI. The course of penetration was given by the teacher
who had spent
20 years in the United States as an illegal, and a
considerable amount
of time, hours, on explosives.
[The Soviets] gave
briefings on the
chiefs of the intelligence agencies their background, the
means and the
methods of recruiting agents used by the intelligence
services of the
United States, and the importance of the illegal centers,
and what, at
that time, they prepared us for to set up the illegal
centers.
In his unpublished manuscript, G2 senior defector Rodriguez
Menier
further described the Soviet training schools:
At
first, every three years about 100 high Cuban officers
took courses on
the theory and practice of intelligence and
counterintelligence. After
1975, every 18 months some 25 of these officers took
“refresher”
courses even as 100 new officers began the three-year
course. While
Soviet instructors of MINFAR taught in Cuba, instructors
for the MININT
did not. [I have] talked with at least 200 of those Cuban
officers and
not one said he had learned anything new. On the contrary,
they
complained that the Soviet professors were hiding very
important
matters from them… The Soviet bloc assisted the MININT in
various ways:
instruction of Cuban officers via academic courses and
provision of
free equipment, accessories, armaments, autos, trucks and
uniforms. The
Soviet Union was the most generous bloc country in terms
of quantity,
but assistance from Hungary and East Germany was of higher
quality…
Within the MININT, Soviet
advisers
were sent to the minister and vice-ministers of
intelligence and
counterintelligence, and to the police from the level of
director down
to the chiefs of operational or technical sections. Sergio
del Valle
and Ramiro Valdés were moderately influenced by Soviet
advisers,
but did not keep their positions for long. The Soviets
were
particularly interested in technical military questions
while the
Cubans wanted immediately usable information. Thus Cubans
would
exchange more general, technical information for
intelligence of
immediate use, such as word on the growth of the
Nicaraguan Contras or
levels of Soviet aid to the Sandinistas.”
The FAS further reported that the DGI
includes three
Liberation Committees - for the Caribbean, Central America,
and South
America - collectively known as the Liberation Directorate
(DL). In the
early 1960's, the DL also was responsible for supporting
liberation
movements in Africa, including those who overthrew the
government of
Zanzibar in 1963.
In his 1982 Senate testimony, Gerardo
Peraza
described the prime directives for all these Cuban
intelligence
agencies:
•
“The principal function of the Directorate of Intelligence
was
penetration and recruitment in the United States of
America. For this
reason, it was divided--before the Soviet Union took over
the control
of the intelligence--in three main sections. Section 3 was
the one
which worked directly against the CIA. It worked with the
principal
center in New York; and the other centers in Canada and
Puerto Rico.”
• “[It is] mandatory for
the members
of the DGI to belong to the party, to have gone through
schools,
intelligence schools in Moscow and in Cuba.”
• “The Soviet intelligence
officers
always saw in the Cuban intelligence service a great
potential of
penetration in the United States, because Cuba is a small
country, not
a great power, and many people in the United States feel a
certain
sympathy toward a small country.”
• “The Cuban intelligence service has always been against
the United
States.
Exclusively. All the other countries where they work, they
do it to
direct the activity against the United States…For example,
when we went
to London, the plans of intelligence work were directed
toward certain
British citizens. But the central or main objective was to
utilize
these people in one way or another to penetrate the United
States,
which is the principal objective of the intelligence center
in London,
the penetration of the American Embassy in London, and all
the efforts
were directed toward that center…in the case of Spain, Cuba
detected
that the United States was directing certain activities from
Spain and
all the group of the CIA that worked--I mean, of the Cuban
intelligence
that worked against the CIA were transferred to Spain to
work against
Spain. But the principal objective was to detect the
activities of the
US intelligence in Spain, with the objective of penetrating
the United
States, with, in other words, all the activities of the
intelligence
service directed toward the penetration of the United
States, which is
the main objective. This is the reason for being of the
Cuban
intelligence service.
• “The rules of the DGI are that all the diplomats who come
to the
United States or to New York have to be members of the
intelligence
service.”
Regarding this last point, FAS notes: “The
Cuban
mission to the United Nations is the third largest UN
delegation, and
it has been alleged that almost half the personnel assigned to
the
mission are DGI officers. The DGI actively recruits within the
Cuban
émigré community and has used refugee flows into the
United States to place agents.”
One facet of Cuba’s intelligence style
explains why,
as shown in the narrative, Lee Oswald had grown impatient with
his
Cuban contacts and felt it was necessary to go to Mexico City
and shake
things up. Rodriguez Menier has written that Cubans are slow
and
methodical in their assessments of a foreign collaborator.
“Much time
is required for what is called the ‘characterization’ of
agents or
potential agents, as a great deal of the success or failure of
a
recruitment and subsequent operations depends upon it,” Menier
informs.
“On average, the Cuban service spends from three to five
months
characterizing a candidate residing on the island and a year
on a
candidate living abroad.”
The furtive Mexican rendezvous of Oswald
and the
Cubans also fits nicely with the Cubans’ modus operandi. “In
order to
avoid the exposure of a very important agent, regardless of
whether his
importance is actual or potential,” says Menier, “the DGI
chooses to
communicate with the agent through an Illegal Officer
[undercover spy]
from this department. The Illegal Officer travels from Cuba to
some
other country on a legal passport but from that country uses a
false
("illegal") passport and an assumed identity. He travels to
two or
three other countries before entering the United States where
he meets
the agent at a scheduled place.”
By Menier’s assessment of his homeland’s
spy
prerequisites, Oswald’s manic devotion to Castro explains why
the
Cubans would have had faith in Oswald’s future potential.
“Cuban
officers always prefer an ideological agent to a mercenary or
one who
is blackmailed since he is less susceptible to becoming a
double-agent
and is more likely to be truthful,” Menier explained. “I know
of no
case where an agent was paid, though it is customary to
reimburse an
agent for expenses incurred while working. Agents are rewarded
with
exquisite or exotic presents, however, which are not
necessarily
valuable in monetary terms. Cuba has not won foreign support
with
dollars but through empathy, ideology, resentment, and the
exploitation
of human misery.”
“Why do foreigners want to become agents?”
Menier
ponders before answering himself. “In the developed nations it
is the
guilt complex because of their material well-being, the
supposed lack
of moral values and the corruption of society.” The very
moral
turpitudes Oswald himself denounced in his writings and radio
debates.
2. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE
UNITED
STATES.
Since the beginnings of Castro’s revolution, “El Leder
Maximum”
has been obsessed with planting spies in the US, especially
within the
ranks of the exile “traitors.” With Castro himself personally
involved
in all of the most important operations, Havana's
information-gathering
machine has been described by former CIA Cuba analyst, Brian
Latell, as
“among the four or five best anywhere in the world.” Asked to
comment
on Castro’s hands-on style, Latell added, “He's good. He's
really,
really good.”
In the beginning, Cuban intelligence used
American
soldier of fortune William Morgan, who had gone to the
mountains to
help Fidel, to entrap over 200 local Cubans who were working
with
counterrevolutionaries 90 miles away in Miami. For the
US, things
only got worse. As seen in the narrative, Castro’s spies had
thoroughly
penetrated every American plot, from the earliest
assassination plots,
to the Bay of Pigs Invasion, to the 1963 re-invasion plans, to
AM/LASH. It has been shown that there were fears
--
and evidence -- that Rolando Cubela was a “double agent,” but
he may
have been the tip of the double agent iceberg. The Kennedys
also pinned
their anti-Castro hopes on fomenting a Cuban military revolt
led by
such luminaries as Granma veteran General Juan Almeida Bosque,
yet if
defected Cuban officers are correct, even Almeida, a recipient
of the
rare title “Hero of the Revolution,” may have been playing his
US
contacts for fools.
Upon his entry into the United States in
1983, Jesus
Mendez, a former DGI agent indicated that back in the 1960's,
Cuban
intelligence recognized that it had, at one point, a 100
percent ratio
of suspected US agents in Cuba doubled and placed back into
the US
reporting on anti-Castro activities. “Nearly all the agents
recruited
by the CIA back to the early sixties were found to be plants
taking
instructions from Cuban premier Fidel Castro,” Mendez
said. Maj.
Florentino Aspilagga Lombard, who defected in 1987,
specifically
identified thirty-eight Cubans recruited by the CIA who were
in fact
doubles working for Fidel, this despite their having passed
CIA lie
detector tests. According to Rodriguez Menier, the
Cubans had
received extensive training in beating the polygraph machine.
Further
the Cuban doubles were instructed to appeal to their case
officers
should there be a problem with the test results. As predicted,
the case
officers were usually manipulated into believing their Cuban
source
over the machine.
Rodriguez Menier produced two internal
documentaries
for MININT, wherein about 40 penetration agents explained how
they had
allowed the CIA to think they made a successful recruiting.
Thus, the
phony US operatives were able to feed a mass of misinformation
to the
CIA that is likely still stored in the computers of US
intelligence. All this begs the question: was Rolando
Cubela
among those who fooled their American handlers?
The Cuban intelligence superiority also
flourished
in the US thanks to groups such as the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee,
which received funding from Havana via its United Nations
delegation in
New York. That delegation is the third largest in the world,
and nearly
half of its personnel are believed by authorities to be DGI
officers.
In the 1970s, FBI agent
Stuart
Hoyt was assigned to field offices in New York, Boston, San
Juan and
Washington, D.C., and for three years he supervised the
agency's
anti-Cuba efforts. He notes that Cuban agents are profligate
in all its
official diplomatic missions, especially the United Nations
(code-named
M15), the Cuban embassies in Mexico City (M2), and Madrid
(M6). Another federal Cuban expert has testified
that
Cuba's intelligence devotes an entire department to
infiltrating exile
groups and another department to getting inside the FBI, CIA,
State
Department and other US governmental agencies.
In a
recent
trial of Cuban spies caught in Miami, Hoyt testified that DGI
agents
used typical spying techniques, including writing secrets on
water-soluble paper that could quickly be destroyed. DGI also
communicated with beepers and pay phones, used
counter-surveillance
measures, post office boxes, fake documents and concealment
devices To
cover themselves, DGI used “compartmentalization,” or
limiting
each person's knowledge, so that “in case one is arrested, he
will not
be able to identify the other.”
On one occasion, Cuba even shared with the US a glimpse of its
penetration of exiles living abroad. In 1979, as Cuba was
preparing for
the 8th Pan Am Games in Puerto Rico, they became concerned for
the
security of their athletes. A Cuban intelligence official met
secretly
with a CIA agent assigned to the San Juan station where he
expressed
his concern. When the CIA officer asked how he could help, the
Cuban
gave him a list of places where the exile activists gathered,
and then
gave him a list of eighty-four names of Cuban exile activists
operating
in San Juan. His hope was that the CIA would keep an eye on
them (CIA
TELEX From San Juan to Director, 7-26-79).
Among other notorious Cuban US intelligence operations:
• In 1990, José Basulto, founder of the anti-Castro group
“Brothers to the Rescue” in Miami, which saved Cuban refugees
stranded
in the ocean between Florida and Cuba, and air-dropped
anti-Castro
leaflets on Havana, recalled an enthusiastic young volunteer
flyer
named Ruben Campa. It wasn’t until eight years later
that Basulto
learned that “Ruben Campa” was an alias borrowed from a dead
Texas boy
and that his recruit's real name was Rene Gonzalez. Gonzalez
and nine
others were arrested and accused of running “La Red Avispa” --
the Wasp
Network -- which prosecutors said was spying on US military
bases and
Cuban exile groups.
• In the summer of 1992, the US Department of State approved a
half-million dollar grant contract to Florida International
University
(FIU) for a study on United States-Cuba relations. Areito
Magazine, the
Antonio Maceo Brigade (BAM), the Cuban-American Committee for
Normalization of Relations with Cuba, the Committee of 75
dialogue
group, the Cuban Culture Circle, and the Institute for Cuban
Studies
(IEC). However, according to former DGI officials Florentino
Azpillaga,
Jesus Perez Mendez, Manuel Espinosa, and US law enforcement
officers,
these organizations were linked to the DGI and its front
group, the
Cuban Institute for Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP).
(Source: CIA Debrief of Mendez).
• During the trial of several Cuban spies in Miami, one of the
accused,
Alejandro Alonso, revealed on December 30, 2000 that he was
instructed
from Havana to locate areas in South Florida "where we can
move persons
as well as things, including arms and explosives."
• In April 2000, in Washington, D.C., a press conference was
held by
Joe Carrollo, the Mayor of Miami, in which he revealed an
intelligence
report charging current Cuba Charge d’Affairs, Fernando
Remirez de
Estenoz, as the person who introduced bacteriological weapons
to kill
blacks by Cuban soldiers during the war in Angola, Africa.
• In 2001, five Cuban agents were convicted in Miami, while
nine more
of their compadres were named, but not captured. The Cuban
government
asserted they were men of courage, sent to the United States
to ferret
out terrorism plots by Cuban exile groups waging war against
President
Fidel Castro. Three months after the 1998 arrests of the
agents, three
Cuban diplomats at the United Nations were expelled for
alleged
involvement with the Miami spy network. Guy Lewis, a former US
attorney
who oversaw the prosecution, said, “It's clear that Cuba's
intelligence
service maintains a contingency of very well-trained,
organized and
financed agents.”
• That same year, a high-ranking US immigration official in
Miami was
convicted of disclosing classified information to Cuba.
• In 2002, Ana Belen Montes, a senior analyst on Cuban affairs
for the
Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, was convicted of
conspiracy
to commit espionage for the Cubans. Montes was so
idealogically
committed to Castro that she spied for free. Referring to the
United
States economic embargo against Cuba, in force since 1961,
Montes
claimed her actions reflected her concern over allegations of
Washington's alleged unfair treatment of the Castro regime.
In a recent interview, when asked whether
Cuba would
continue to send agents to the United States Ricardo Alarcon
--
president of Cuba's National Assembly and the
third-most-powerful
political figure on the island after Castro and his brother,
Raúl -- said emphatically: "Yes, with a capital Y."
How have Cuba’s intelligence agencies
managed to
stay so successful in their US operations for over forty
years? G2
defectors Menier and Peraza have quick answers. Menier:
“American
misunderstandings and miscalculations made it possible for the
MININT
to consolidate its operation with considerable efficiency…
Americans
not only miscalculated the MININT, they misunderstood the
Cuban people
in general. The US has failed to realize the enormous
potential for
surveillance that an ideologically motivated neighborhood
could
unleash… It was so easy to place penetration agents both in
Cuba and
Miami. The US government could not tell the difference between
a Cuban
who had been affected by the revolution and another who had
benefitted
from it. It was unable to fully realize how much the agents
and
officials of the MININT were willing to sacrifice for their
cause. Even
though the fight was harsh and to the bitter end, MININT
members always
felt they were the winners.”
Gerardo Peraza testified before Congress
that “there
are now about 300 DGI officers and agents in the Miami area
alone. The
objective of these 300 agents is to distract the
counterintelligence
services of the United States when they send such a number of
agents.…the counterintelligence agencies, because of the small
number
of agents, have no possibility of detecting the true
agents…the
FBI does not have the time to detect the real agents.
This is
reason why, for instance, that my professor of intelligence in
Moscow
spent 20 years in an illegal center in the United States, and
claimed
to have never been bothered.”
In one embarrassing exchange, a Senate
committeeman
asked Peraza if there had been many successful placings of
high-ranking
DGI or KGB agents within the US intelligence service or any
defense or
security-oriented agencies. To which Peraza replied,
“Yes,
definitely. We can use as an example the Senate.” The
senator
quickly muzzled the witness, saying, “I imagine we better have
a closed
session on that.” Peraza said he’d be happy to do just that.
Peraza continued:
“The
weakness in the US intelligence in the years 1965 to 1970
gave the
opportunity to install those people in America. The
problem was that
when the Cuban intelligence service had nobody to obstruct
its work,
there was no activity detected. There was no possibility,
no way that
the United States could do anything against Cuba. All the
forces were
directed to prepare the penetration and the intelligence
work against
the United States from different countries.”
From Menier’s manuscript, Protecting and
Promoting
Fidel:
“The
problem is that the counterintelligence services of the
United States
always pay more attention to the Soviet intelligence
officers. For
example, a Cuban intelligence officer, if he makes a
contact with an
American who has access to high, to classified information
in the
United States, he can do it much more easily. When Soviet
intelligence
officers become active in New York or in Washington, you
can see the
counterintelligence focused on the Cubans decrease. We
made an
experiment. The center of the Soviet intelligence in New
York made an
experiment, a joint operation on a certain day between
Cuba and the
Soviet Union. That day the Soviet officers in New York and
the Cuban
officers went out to see if they detected a lessening in
the pressure
on the Cuban intelligence officers. It almost disappeared
when the
Soviets began to move within their network.”
In a recent interview, Ricardo Alarcon,
president of
Cuba's National Assembly and the third-most-powerful political
figure
on the island after Castro and his brother, Raúl, described
the
work of secret agents as the right of a sovereign nation to
defend
itself.
Asked whether Cuba would continue to send agents to the United
States,
Alarcon shifted from Spanish to English and said emphatically:
“Yes,
with a capital Y.”
3. THE ONGOING RELATIONSHIP
WITH RUSSIA
Understandably obscured by the furor over the 1962 insertion
of Soviet
nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962, was the installation that
same year
of the Soviets’ largest foreign SIGINT (signal intelligence)
site in
Lourdes Cuba. Located approximately 30 outside of Havana, the
Lourdes
facility, according to the FAS, “is reported to cover a 28
square mile
area with 1,000-1,500 Soviet and then Russian engineers,
technicians,
and military personnel working at the base. Those familiar
with the
Lourdes facility have confirmed that the base has multiple
groups of
tracking dishes and its own satellite system, with some groups
used to
intercept telephone calls, faxes, and computer communications,
in
general, and with other groups used to cover targeted
telephones and
devices.”
Since the missile crisis, the Russian-Cuban
relationship has been marked by ups and downs. The Russians
have always
perceived Cuba as a useful tool to aggrandize themselves with
smaller
nations that identified with the Cuban-US “David vs.
Goliath”
paradigm. The relationship went smoothly until the Cubans
stumbled in
places like Zaire and Bolivia. That, combined with a Cuban
faction that
has always been suspicious of the Cuban-Russian partnership,
led to
Soviet economic brinksmanship tactics (which included an oil
embargo)
in the late sixties and early seventies. Afterward, the DGI
became
subordinate to the KGB, and Manuel Piñeiro was forced from his
DGI post. Piñeiro had been Deputy Minister of the Interior in
charge of the state security apparatus from 1964-1968, but now
he was
placed in charge of the DGI's Latin American affairs division.
Subsequently, Piñeiro lived in Chile
for several months, trying to secure the Salvador Allende
government.
After the overthrow of Allende in September 1973, Piñeiro's
Americas Department helped Cuba bolster revolutionary
movements in
Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia's National. On a
more
successful note, he provided Nicaragua’s Sandinistas with
intelligence,
communications, arms, and even exiled Chilean Army officers,
who had
earlier been incorporated into the Cuban Armed Forces.
Cuba's
first of many narco-terrorist operations in 1981 was also a
Piñeiro brainchild. Piñeiro died in a 1998 car
crash in Havana.
In the seventies, the Soviets also
collaborated with
the DGI to assist CIA defector Philip Agee in the publication
of the
Covert Action Information Bulletin. Funding for the bulletin
came from
the KGB, while the DGI ghostwrote many of the articles. The
relationship between these Russia and Cuba is likely to
continue based
upon the June 14, 1993 agreement on military cooperation
between Russia
and Cuba.
-----------------------------------
This was the
arms-for-drugs
deal with Colombia's M-19 movement, revealed with the 1981
arrest of
Jaime Guillot Lara. Cuba's ambassador at the time, Fernando
Ravelo, was
pulled out of Colombia after the scandal, and reassigned as
Piñeiro's deputy at the Americas Department.
-----------------------------------
4. THE EIGHTIES AND BEYOND:
CASTRO
& DRUGS
This period marked the beginning of the end for Valdez’ former
right-hand man, Jose Abrantes Fernandez, the vaunted head of
MININT,
often referred to as the third-most powerful man in Cuba.
Starting in
the seventies, MININT’s dealings with Southern Hemisphere
guerrillas
turned into cooperation with its drug dealers and involvement
in drug
trafficking. It had been suggested to Abrantes, and
Abrantes
proposed to Fidel, that Cuba cooperate with drug dealers in
striking
out at the United States: If Cuba opened its skies and shores
to
shipments of drugs to the United States, the narco-traffickers
would
help Cuba overcome a long-standing problem, namely getting
material
support to guerrillas in Latin America. Not coincidentally,
the drug
trade also became a significant source of hard currency income
for
Fidel Castro and, according to his way of thinking, an
efficient way to
weaken North American society. “Cuba needs the dollars
and
perhaps some of the consumer goods that are being offered by
the
Colombians,” a source said. “And the quid pro quo is
allowing
those [Colombian cocaine] factions to flourish by doing their
drug
trade through Cuba.”
On November 15, 1982, close aides to
Castro,
including DGI officers, were convicted in the US on charges of
smuggling drugs into the United States. On February 7, 1983, a
former
member of the DGI testified in the District Court for the
Southern
District of Florida, that Cuban involvement in international
drug
operations was a multifaceted, methodical campaign aimed at
undermining
the United States and its international stature. And in 1988
testimony
from José Blandón Castillo, a former intelligence aid to
Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega, provided further evidence
concerning
Cuba's role in the drug flow of the United States. But
since that
time, the dam has burst, with countless sources detailing the
Castros
role in drug trafficking.
The evidence is overwhelming that for over
thirty
years, the Castro regime has officially sanctioned the use of
its
airspace as a drug superhighway into the US. Both Castro
brothers have
been directly implicated – by senior Cuban officials and
dealers alike
– in narco-trafficking and money laundering partnerships with
the
notorious Medellin and Cali drug cartels.
Among those giving testimony:
Rodríguez Menier saw
firsthand how in the 1970s then Interior Minister Abrantes
convinced
Fidel of the benefits of cooperating with international drug
traffickers. He also relates how former Panamanian strongman,
Manuel
Noriega, would meet with Castro to discuss money-laundering
solutions
for drug monies. “So they begin to deal directly, to buy and
sell, buy
and sell, as well as providing facilities, because they don't
cut out
the drug dealers. No, what they do is operate it where the
drug dealers
can't. It's like a Mafia family. Fidel became a family but
without
harming the interests of other families. It became so blatant,
the
drugs were dropped in broad daylight within sight of the Las
Americas
Restaurant, one of Cuba's top tourist attractions.”
Major Florentino Aspillaga
confirmed that the cocaine proceeds were deposited in his
Swiss bank
accounts “in order to finance liberation movements.”
Manuel de Beunza
claims that
monies obtained by Cuba from drug trafficking were laundered
through
Swiss banks by way of delivering old US dollar bills in
exchange for
credits to bank accounts held by Cuba… “I took part in a
meeting at
which Fidel Castro ordered the creation of companies that were
to be
involved in drug dealing. There were others there, like Osmany
Cienfuegos, Tony de la Guardia, Jose Abrantes. Two of the
business
fronts named by de Beunza were Happy Line Shipping and a
trading
concern called Mercurio…I know Fidel Castro and I was at the
meeting
where the company was set up. He ordered the creation of
these
companies with the specific aim of their getting involved in
drug
trafficking… Admiral Perez Betancourt told me that Aldo
Santamaria was
involved in drug trafficking. He said Aldo was following Fidel
and
Raúl's orders but he was doing it reluctantly.”
Jose Luis llovio-Menendez,
former
Chief Adviser, Cuban Ministry of Finance: “Tony de la
Guardia
knew that Fidel was involved in drug trafficking. He was the
only
living witness except perhaps Raúl Castro and Abrantes who
knew
that Fidel was involved in drug trafficking. Fidel had to get
rid of
him… I felt very angry and I felt that Fidel had been
merciless. He has
protected his image by killing a man who was acting under his
orders.”
Ileana de la Guardia
testified
before the US Congress in 1999 that her father -- Tony de la
Guardia
[Colonel la Guardia was a high-ranked] intelligence officer],
who was
executed in a 1989 “show trial” of drug traffickers -- had
told her
that Fidel Castro had several bank accounts to which proceeds
of drug
trafficking operations were sent.
Cuban Air Force Brigadier
General
Rafael del Pino, the highest-ranking defector from
Cuba’s Armed
Forces (Defected, May 28, 1987), has described how large
numbers of
drug running planes from Colombia and elsewhere were given
free reign
of Cuban airspace… “The permission to overfly Cuba had to have
to come
from [Raúl Castro’s] ministry of defense…Several times I
received orders from Raúl Castro's office and also from
General
Abrantes's office to let the airplane cross over Cuba.”
Florentino Aspillaga
also
confirmed the long-term personal involvement of the Castro
brothers in
the drug trade. Just like the others, he explains that
it would
be impossible for these operations to be carried out without
the
personal approval of Fidel.
Jorge Masetti’s
compelling
autobiography describes his participation in drug trafficking,
counterfeiting, kidnappings, bank robberies, and other
criminal and
terrorist operations in Latin America on Cuba’s behalf under
Manuel
Piñeiro and the Americas Department.
Robert Kammer, US Customs
Special
Agent: “There was certainly indications of
Cuban
involvement way before 1987. Going back into the early '80s,
there were
cases involving the Cubans involved in drug-trafficking into
the US.”
Johnny Crump, the most
successful Colombian coke smuggler – “All the Cuban
government
was approving the operation.”
Carlos Lehder-Rivas, a
founding
member of the Medellin Cartel, serving a sentence of life plus
135
years. – “Without the permission of Fidel, I could have
never
gone into Cuba.” Lehder testified in a 1991 federal trial that
he met
twice in Havana with Raúl Castro to arrange safe passage for
cocaine flights over Cuban airspace.
The hypocrisy of the Castros’ position on
drug
dealing reached its zenith in 1989, when fourteen of his most
loyal,
longtime comrades were put on “show trial” for drug smuggling.
With
foreign observers were banned by the court, ten were given
thirty-year
sentences, while four, including General Arnaldo T. “El Moro”
Ochoa
Sánchez, were sentenced to death. This would be the US
equivalent of charging Gen. Colin Powell with child
molestation. Ochoa
had participated in the guerrilla war against Batista and
later became
a high-ranking member of Castro's armed forces and of the
Communist
Party. Between 1967 and 1969, Ochoa was sent by Castro to
train rebels
in the Congo and later took part in an expedition into
Venezuela to try
to overthrow the democratically elected government of that
country. In
1975, Ochoa was sent to fight in a critical campaign against
the FNLA
in Angola. In 1977 he was named commander of Cuban
Expeditionary Forces
in Ethiopia under the command of Soviet General Petrov. In
1980, Ochoa
was awarded the coveted title, “Hero of the Revolution,” by
Castro.
Nonetheless, Ochoa and three
others were
executed by firing squad on July 12, 1989 (under Cuban law,
the maximum
sentence for drug smuggling is 15 years.)
Two months later, Castro held another show
trial in
order to purge MININT of seven “disloyal” officers, among the
scapegoats would be none other than the revered Angola war
hero and
MININT Chief Jose Abrantes Fernandez. Using trumped up
charges to
destroy opponents to his unyielding hard line, Castro gave
harsh prison
sentences to men such as Abrantes. Most observers understood
the trials
for what they were: methods to destroy not only those who had
firsthand
knowledge of the Castros’ drug dealing, but also progressive
political
opponents who were pressuring the regime to follow Russia’s
evolution
to “Perestroika” and “Glasnost.”
Amazingly, federal prosecutors in Miami
were
prepared to indict Raúl Castro and Manuel Piñeiro Losada
as the heads of a major Colombian cocaine smuggling conspiracy
in 1993,
but the Clinton Administration Justice Department overruled
them,
according to current and former Justice Department officials
familiar
with the investigation. The draft indictment, as described by
a former
Justice Department official who saw it, listed Raúl Castro as
the leader of a conspiracy involved in smuggling seven and a
half tons
of cocaine into the United States over a 10-year period. At
least a
dozen other Cubans were also to be indicted.
“It was a major investigation involving
numerous
witnesses that was killed at the highest levels in
Washington,” said a
former Justice Department official with direct knowledge of
the
case. There were a number of reasons given for removing
Raúl’s name from the indictment at the last moment.
“There
were numerous national security and intelligence issues that
would have
made the case difficult,” said Tom Cash, the former head of
the Drug
Enforcement Administration office in Miami. Others said that,
without a
smoking gun document trail, the dozens of eyewitnesses, most
of whom
were drug dealers or defectors from Cuban intelligence, could
have been
impeached by defense attorneys.
Three years later, Colombian coke smuggler
Jorge
Cabrera was busted in Miami in the midst of a 20,000 lb. coke
delivery.
The suspects told investigators that the dope was smuggled
though
Havana with the personal approval of Fidel, a contention
bolstered by
the fact that in Cabrera’s possession were photos of him
embracing both
Fidel Castro and Manuel Piñeiro. Other sources said that
after the photos were taken, Fidel went off for a long private
chat
with Cabrera. Castro allegedly told him, “I know your friends
from
Cali. I've met them. I know they're here (in Cuba). I like
doing
business with them.”
For the second time, the Clinton
administration had
the Cuban links pulled from the indictment, despite the fact
that the
evidence against Castro was far more substantial than the
evidence that
led to the drug indictment of former Panamanian strongman
Manuel
Antonio Noriega in 1988. Clinton cynics liked to point
out that a
year earlier Jorge Cabrera had written a $20,000 check to the
Democratic National Committee days after he was tapped for a
contribution in Havana. And within a month of his donation,
Cabrera was
dining with Vice President Al Gore in Miami and being feted by
Bill and
Hillary at the White House.
The Clinton administration was not yet
finished
covering up for Fidel, et al. On December 6, 1998, in the
northern
Colombian port cities of Cartagena, Barranquilla and Santa
Marta,
Colombian officials seized seven-and-a-half tons of cocaine
and quickly
learned that the traffickers had been using Cuba as a transit
point for
drug shipments to Europe and the United States. Although local
police
were delighted with the bust, US diplomats weren't so pleased.
After
informing the State Department of the busts, the US
authorities tied to
pressure the Colombians into back off the Cuban connection.
US lawmakers on the House Government Reform and Oversight
Committee
were incensed and demanded an explanation from Secretary of
State
Madeleine Albright. At the time, the Clinton administration
was moving
to ease the tensions between the US and Cuba. Committee
Chairman Dan
Burton of Indiana wrote Albright: “Sources close to the
American
embassy in Bogota have informed me that officials at the US
Embassy
solicited silence from the Colombian National Police regarding
a
seven-and-a-half-ton cocaine seizure, destined for Cuba,
because it
could hurt our budding relationship with the Western
Hemisphere's only
surviving dictator.” He added irately: “It is only logical to
conclude
the reason there has been no official reaction from the State
Department on the seizure is that State did not want the air
of
coddling a ruthless dictator to be muddied by allegations of
drug
trafficking.” The letter went unanswered.
5. Political Executions,
Terror, and
Assassinations
It is a dicey business for an American to accuse another
country of
terrorism, especially given the US’s own questionable history
on this
subject (see “slavery,” “Vietnam,” the “overthrow of
Mossadegh in
Iran,” the “invasions of Laos and Cambodia,” “Manifest
Destiny”, “genocide of Native Americans,” etc,
etc.)
However, it is nonetheless safe to say that, from Vietnam to
the Middle
East to Africa to South America to the US itself, Cuba will
back any
movement, regardless of its penchant for taking innocent
lives, so long
as it is anti-American. According to the American Federation
of
Scientists, “much of this activity has been handled through
the
DGI.”
As early as April 1948, when Castro worked
with
revolutionaries in Bogota, Colombia, the pattern has played
out
virtually non-stop. According to Georgie Anne Geyer’s
Guerrilla Prince,
the Colombian revolt left 5,000 dead and a third of Bogota in
ashes. In
Cuba five years later, when Castro masterminded a failed
terrorist
attack on the Moncada Garrison, his men gained infamy when
they killed
soldiers in their hospital beds. The Castro brothers’
takeover of
Cuba in 1959 was condemned worldwide for its resultant
thousands of
summary executions without trials, and massive political
incarcerations. These abominations established a culture
of fear
that quickly eliminated most resistance. In the years since,
inhumane
prison conditions and unspeakable torture have successfully
nipped any
latent anti-Castro movements in the bud.
Cuba Archive Project President Maria Werlau
and her
associate, Dr. Armando Lago, a Harvard-trained economist, have
spent
years studying the human cost of Castro’s revolution.
The archive
project, often likened to the 1999 “Black Book of Communism”
which
documented the worldwide cost of communism, has concluded that
some
5,600 Cubans have died in front of firing squads and another
1,200 in
“extrajudicial assassinations.” Werlau and Lago further
determined that Fidel delegated most of the killings to his
brother
Raul and their longtime friend from the revolution’s formative
days in
Mexico, Ernesto Guevara. Relying only on firsthand
interviews
with Castro’s political prisoners, Werlau and Lago have
described
Guevara as “a gleeful executioner” at the infamous La Cabaña
Fortress prison, where, under his orders, at least 151 Cubans
were
lined up and shot in the first year of the revolution
alone.
Among those murdered were some 94 minors as young as age
fourteen. And females were not immune: in 1961,
25-year-old Lydia
Pérez López was eight months pregnant when a prison guard
kicked her in the stomach. She lost her baby and, without
medical
attention, bled to death. A 70-year-old woman named Edmunda
Serrat
Barrios was beaten to death in 1981 in a Cuban jail. The Cuba
Archive
has documented 219 female deaths including 11 firing squad
executions
and 20 extrajudicial assassinations.
Once in power, Guevara was also responsible
for
several thousand more executions during the first years of the
revolution, as well as those killed in the guerrilla uprisings
he
sponsored in Latin America, and in which he participated after
he had
left Cuba. No one knows how many people Guevara personally
killed,
ordered killed, or who died as a result of his actions. Lago
believes
the number for Cuba alone is 4,000. It is said
that Guevara
was proud of shooting his enemies in the back of the head. He
was also
vocal in his hatred, and candid in his use of hate as a
driving force.
“Hatred is an element in the struggle,” he said, “unbending
hatred for
the enemy which pushes a human being beyond his natural
limitations….” “A people without hate cannot triumph
against the
adversary.” During the Cuban missile crisis Guevara pushed for
war,
since a nuclear holocaust, he believed, would purge the world
of evil
and make way for the rise of a new and better order.
As for Raul, his hand was first shown in 1958, in the Sierra
Maestra,
when he dispatched with 11 peasants for refusing to serve as
guides or
otherwise cooperate with the Rebel Army. From January 1 to
January 13,
1959, 272 executions directly attributed to Raúl Castro were
carried out in Santiago de Cuba, 90 without a prior trial, and
78 with
Raúl Castro delivering the coup de grace. In 1959, 263
additional executions were carried out in Raúl Castro’s line
of
command outside of Santiago, in the rest of the province of
Oriente. In
1960, 4 executions were carried out in Havana under Raúl
Castro’s line of command.
The Inter-American Human Rights Commission
and Wall
Street Journal columnist Mary Anastasia O’Grady both added
still
another grisly aspect to the Castros’ firing squad
horrors: The
executioners routinely extracted an average of seven pints of
blood
from many of the condemned, leaving them in a state of
cerebral anemia,
unconsciousness, and paralysis before they were shot. Their
blood was
then sold to Communist Vietnam at a rate of $50 per pint with
the dual
purpose of obtaining hard currency and contributing to the
Vietcong
cause.
Executions occur not only for political
reasons.
High on the list of Castro’s internal enemies are numerous
religious
organizations and their followers. On December 3rd, 1980, the
three
García-Marín brothers, ages 25, 21, and 19, members of
the persecuted Jehova's Witnesses, sought asylum at the
Vatican Embassy
("Nunciatura") in Havana. Cuban Special Troops burst in and
took them
into custody, where they were sentenced to execution by firing
squad. A
month later, the three were taken from their cells in the
middle of the
night and never seen again. Their mother was sentenced to
twenty years
in prison for protesting her sons’ killings and released ten
years
later when her mental health deteriorated. She died still
pleading that
she be given their bones for proper burial.
Similarly, many young Catholic leaders have
been
executed in Cuba, some reported by international
organizations, while
others remain known only to the survivors’ families, many of
whom have
been denied remains for burial.
Cuba’s penchant for terror did not stop at
its
shoreline. It is a historical fact that Fidel Castro has
nurtured
relationships with countless violent actors from other
countries from
his first days in power, creating The National Liberation
Directorate
(DLN) in Cuba to support revolutionary groups throughout the
world. The
DLN, under trusted Castro ally Manuel “Red Beard” Piñeiro,
(“Barbaroja”), was responsible for planning and coordinating
Cuba's
terrorist training camps on the island, covert movement of
personnel
and military supplies from Cuba and a propaganda apparatus.
The DLN was
reorganized into the Americas Department (DA) under the
Communist Party
of Cuba Central Committee. The DA centralized control over
Cuban
activities for supporting national liberation movements, and
was
responsible for planning and coordinating Cuba's secret
guerrilla and
terrorist training camps, overseeing the covert movement of
personnel
and material from Cuba, and developing a propaganda
apparatus. In
addition, the Cuban controlled Latin American Solidarity
Organization (LASO), with its permanent seat in Havana,
was
created to “coordinate and foment the fight against North
American
imperialism.”
Cuba’s foreign alliances are painstakingly
documented in a number of studies, especially those by Eugene
Pons, and
the Cuba Project’s Werlau and Lago. Among the “Friends
of the
Revolution” cited are the following:
• African-American revolutionaries in the US, via the
Macheteros,
a Puerto Rican terrorist group that provided aid and training
to the
Black Panthers and the Black Liberation Army, as well as a
safe haven
on the island for black leaders. Castro continuously
promoted the
independence of Puerto Rico and supported the Macheteros, who
committed
terrorist acts and bank robberies in the United States.
Several
still live in Cuba, including Black Liberation Army leader
Joanne
Chesimard, aka Assata Shakur, one of New Jersey's most wanted
fugitives
for killing a New Jersey State trooper in 1973, and Charlie
Hill a
member of the Republic of New Afrika Movement wanted for the
hijacking
of TWA 727 and the murder of a New Mexico State trooper. The
Macheteros
highjacked a Wells Fargo truck in Connecticut in September
1983 and
stole $7.2 million.
• The Irish Republican Army (IRA) established its Latin
American
headquarters in Havana.
• Castro dispatched DGI interrogators to Hanoi to torture
American POWs.
• Basque terrorists (ETA) responsible for hundreds of deaths
in Spain
(see esp. the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings that left
191 dead
and over 2,000 injured). Cuba is a training ground and
sanctuary
for the ETA, where it established its headquarters.
• African leaders from Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria,
South
Africa, Spanish Guinea, Tanganyika and Zanzibar arrived in
Cuba for
military training. Algerian FLN, whom Castro supported with
weapons,
shelter, medical and educational services and cooperation in
the fields
of counter-intelligence and intelligence. Guevara personally
engaged in
guerrilla operations in Congo-Kinshasa (formerly Zaire) in
1965. Cuba
joined with Algeria and Libya on a diplomatic/political
offensive in
support of the Frente POLISARIO (People's Front for the
Liberation of
Western Sahara and Rio del Oro); later on provided military
cooperation, and medical services.
• In the Western Hemisphere, Cuba’s allies included: The
Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC); Hugo Chavez of
Venezuela;
guerrilla warriors in Uruguay, the Dominicans, Nicaragua
(Sandinistas),
and Colombia -- where the M19 guerrilla group captured the
Dominican
Embassy and the Justice building in Bogota and assassinated
several
prominent Colombian judges. Guatemalans, Venezuelans and
Chileans were
trained in special camps in Cuba and infiltrated back to their
countries; Argentine born Cuban intelligence agent Jorge
Massetti
helped funnel Cuban funds to finance Puerto Rican terrorists
belonging
to the Machetero group. From an article in Human Events
in 1981:
“Since 1975, Puerto Rican terrorist groups have perpetrated
260 acts of
violence on the island, according to official count. These
range from
bombings of banks, post offices and US business enterprises to
blowing
up electric power plants and assaulting military installations
and
personnel. An estimated 70 or more violent attacks were
committed on
the mainland during the same period, mostly by the FALN.
Federal
authorities have revived their investigations into 31 unsolved
bombings
in New York City alone, based on new information supplied by
Alfredo
Mendez: “......The ‘father of the FALN,’ and in a
sense of
Puerto Rico's modern terrorist movement, is a 42-year-old
Puerto Rican
agent of Cuban intelligence who is wanted in Puerto Rico for
jumping
$2,000 bail, Filiberto Inocencio Ojeda Rios. He founded and
led the
very first of Puerto Rico's new terrorist groups, the
Independent Armed
Revolutionary Movement (MIRA), in 1967. MIRA members
received
training and arms in Cuba and became operational in early
1969, when
they bombed a police station, destroying two police cars, a
bank and
other enterprises."
• One of the most infamous graduates of the Cuban terrorist
training’s
camps was Illich Ramirez Sanchez, known as “Carlos the
Jackal.”
After attending the Third Tricontinental Conference in January
1966
with his father, Ramírez spent the following summer at Camp
Mantanzas, a guerrilla warfare school run by the DGI located
near
Havana. Ramirez masterminded numerous terrorist bombings
against
Israeli interests in the 1970s, most notably the deadly 1975
raid on
OPEC headquarters in Vienna.
• Fidel Castro maintained close working relations with Libya’s
Moammar
Qaddafi. According to an AP dispatch dated May 16, 2001,
Castro visited
Qaddafi six times from March 6 to May 16, 2001. This last
suspicious
visit was after visiting Algeria, Iran, Malaysia, Qatar and
Syria. Qaddafi even presented Fidel with a human rights
award for
“his fight against the US.”
• Castro cultivated a friendship with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein --
both
shared a fondness for bacteriological weapons -- as well
as other
state sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East. Jonathan
T.
Stride exposed Castro’s chemical/biological weapons factories,
while
Ernesto Betancourt traced the possible connection and
cooperation
between the two tyrants exporting viruses to the US.
Science
journalist Richard Preston wrote in the New Yorker that, “a
quotation
made by Saddam refers to a dossier about ‘details of his
ultimate
weapon, developed in secret laboratories outside Iraq. Free of
U.N.
inspection, the laboratories would develop the SV1417 strain
of the
West Nile virus – capable of destroying 97 percent of life in
an urban
environment . . ..’ Now, where could such a research be
undertaken?” Experts believe it was Cuba.
Radio Marti, in addition to American
newspapers,
also reported in August 26, 2001 that the West Nile virus in
the US
might have been an export from Cuba, noting that, “in 1980
Castro
ordered the unleashing of a biological war against the
US.”
Marti quoted Dr. Luis Roberto Henandez saying, “Cuba’s
laboratories
identify and produce viruses for migratory birds.”
Betancourt’s article
published in Spanish in Miami’s El Nuevo Herald appeared as
the main
source in Radio Marti’s report. Betancourt suggested a
few
characteristics of Hussein’s “secret laboratories
outside Iraq”
: “It must have a technological capability to undertake
such
research, a country friendly to Iraq and hostile to the US,
outside the
reach of any UN inspection, a closed society, where
these
activities can be free of press coverage; and located
within the
reach of migratory birds. There is one place on earth that
meets those
requirements: Castro’s Cuba. The research undertaken in
Cuba is
precisely centered on developing virus strains suitable to be
inoculated to the many migratory birds that fly North-South in
the fall
and South-North in the spring. It can be concluded that Cuba
is the
most plausible candidate for the germ warfare research and
development
activities referred to by Saddam Hussein in [Preston’s] The
New Yorker
article.”
According to a 1997 paper by Dr. Manuel
Cereijo,
Cuba regularly develops computer viruses “with the intent of
using them
to disrupt computer systems during time of war or crisis.”
Many Cuban
Americans in the US have had their computers damaged by
made-in-Cuba
viruses.
• In 1970, a “Mini Manual for Revolutionaries” was published
in the
official LASO publication Tricontinental, written by Brazilian
urban
terrorist leader Carlos Marighella. The manual gave precise
instructions in terror tactics, kidnappings, etc. The short
book was
translated into numerous languages and distributed worldwide
by Cuba.
• Cuban agents in Mexico engaged in bank robberies that
financed
several terrorist groups from Latin America operating out of
Mexico.
Dozen of Mexicans received training in terrorism and guerrilla
warfare
in Sierra del Rosario, Pinar del Rio Province and in Guanabo,
in
eastern Cuba.
• Cuba provided advanced weapons and demolition
training to the
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru. The Tupac
Amaru
attacked the US Embassy in 1984, bombed the Texaco offices in
1985, and
attacked the residence of the US Ambassador in 1985 all in
Lima, Peru.
• According to Rodriguez Menier and the Hoover Institution's
William
Ratliff, Cuban intelligence officers in the Middle East for
years have
recruited Islamist militants for use against the United
States.
Assassinations
In addition to the 1962 Cuban plot in Mexico City against JFK
and the
1967 perceived threat by Escalante and Raul against LBJ (both
noted in
narrative), Cuba has much other experience in the area of
foreign
assassinations. The reports of Werlau and Lago named 67
foreigners
assassinated by Cuban intelligence. The Miami-based Brigada,
the Bay of
Pigs invasion force alumni organization, places the figure
closer to
3,600.
The CIA’s JM/WAVE Station in Florida
interviewed an
informant who stated bluntly that Cuba “employs killers and
assassins…Two persons were killed in Mexico by Robert
Coronevsky who
received three hundred dollars for the deed from the Embassy
in Mexico
[City].” Walterio Carbonell, a former Cuban
Ambassador to
Morocco, who knew Castro since his school days, has stated
that ever
since Castro made his first ambassadorial appointment, the
candidates
had to foreswear to murder their US counterparts if so
ordered.
Interviewed in the October 23, 1975 edition of the Miami
Herald,
Carbonell said that the assassinations would be carried out in
the
event that a CIA plot against him succeeded. Failure to make
the blood
oath rendered a diplomat ineligible for an
ambassadorship.
According to an FBI report, one such murderous Cuban
ambassador was its
man in Panama, who enlisted assassin Humberto Rodriguez Diaz,
who
fought with Fidel in the Sierra Maestra, to murder Panama’s
President
Roberto Chiari Remón, who was president while JFK was in
office.
In 1976, The Los Angeles Times revealed
that
then-President Gerald Ford and then- Governor Ronald Reagan
were to be
assassinated by the DGI during the Republican National
Convention in
San Francisco. The plot was coordinated in Cuba by a DGI
agent
named Andres Gomez, who had trained the US hitman, Gregg
Daniel
Adornetto, in Cuba, where he also received funding. The
Emiliano
Zapata Unit, a Bay Area radical terrorist group, would also
participate
in the hits. After his arrest, Adornetto revealed the
assassination
plot's “Cuban link” as Gomez. Adornetto had met him
years earlier
when as a member of the terrorist Weather Underground he
traveled to
Cuba for training and funding.
Sources:
Menier , Juan Antonio Rodríguez (unpublished manuscript):
Protecting and Promoting Fidel: Inside Cuba’s Interior
Ministry.
- Menier; The Way It Happened; Author House, 2006
“Traffickers Tie Castro to Drug Run,” July 25, 1996, Miami
Herald.
Werlau, Maria C., Fidel Castro, Inc.: A Global
Conglomerate, May 26, 2006, CANF.org
Roig-Franzia , Manuel, “Cubans Jailed in US as Spies Are
Hailed at Home
as Heroes,” June 3, 2006, Washington Post Foreign Service
Frontline: Cuba and Cocaine; Episode #910; February 5, 1991
Brian Ross and Vic Walter Report, “Raúl Castro: Cocaine
Connection?” August 14, 2006
Carl Limbacher, “Clinton Donor-Drug Smuggler Fingered Castro,”
NewsMax.com
April 10, 2000
Robert Weiner and Jeffrey Buchanan, “Life After Fidel
Will Mean
Raúl ; Changing Names is No Change At All,” Palm Beach
Post, June 6, 2004
Kessler, Inside the CIA, p. 35-36
Jamie Dettmer, “Raining on the Drug-Trafficking Parade - US
allegedly
asked Columbian officials to remain quiet about Cuban drug
connection,”
Insight on the News, Feb 8, 1999
Rex A. Hudson: “Coordinating Cuba's Support for
Marxist-Leninist
Violence in the Americas;” The Cuban American National
Foundation; 1988
Gerardo Peraza testimony before US Senate, Subcommittee on
Security and
Terrorism, Committee on the Judiciary; “Hearing on the Role of
Cuba in
International Terrorism and Subversion; Intelligence
Activities of the
DGI”; February 26, 1982
US Dept of the Army, 57-pg. “Notes on the DGI,” March 25,
1973;
released under FOIA, 3-22-2002
Frank O. Mora, “Cuba’s Ministry of Interior: The FAR ’s Fifth
Army,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 26, No.
2, pp.
222–237, 2007 National War College, National Defense
University,
Washington, DC, USA
Robbins, Carla Anne, The Cuban Threat, Philadelphia:
ISHI
Publications, 1985.
Barron, John, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents
(New York:
Bantam Books, 1974)
US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal
Security
Subcommittee, Hearings, Part 20, Communist Threat to the
United States
Through the Caribbean, October 16, 1969, p. 1425, citing the
testimony
of DGI defector Orlando Castro Hidalgo.
US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Cuba's
Renewed
Support For Violence in Latin America, Special Report No. 90,
December
14, 1981, p. 12.
Sterling, Claire, The Terror Network: The Secret War of
International
Terrorism (esp. pp. 247-257); Holt, 1981
US Senate investigator Alfonso L. Tarabochia's testimony in US
Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal
Security
Subcommittee, Terroristic Activity: “The Castro Connection in
Puerto
Rico: Castro's Hand in Puerto Rican and US Terrorism,” 94th
Cong., 1st
sess., Part 6, July 30, 1975, p. 379.
Alfonso Chardy, "Sandinistas Using MiGs in Cuba; Sources Say
Nicaragua
Has Formed Combat Squadron," Miami Herald, June 14, 1987;
Bernard E. Trainor, "US Fears Soviet Use of New Nicaraguan
Airfield,"
New York Times, July 26, 1987;
Julia Preston, "Nicaragua Says It Will Proceed With Plans To
Get MiGs,"
Washington Post, August 3, 1987.
"Cuban Mission is Packed with Spies, Defector Says," Miami
Herald, 23
September 1987.
November 10, 1995 issue of Executive Intelligence Review:
Manuel
Piñeiro
Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuba in the 1980s," Foreign Affairs, Fall
1986, p.
130.
Damian J. Fernandez, Cuba's Foreign Policy in the Middle East
(Boulder,
Colorado: Westview, 1988).
Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and
Diplomatic
Account of US-Cuban Relations Since 1957 (New York and London:
W. W.
Norton & Co., 1987)
March 19, 1976, Los Angles Times, "Cuban Link to Death Plot
Probed."
Humberto Fontova, Cuba: Castro Saved President Reagan,
September 14,
2007
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
DADE
COUNTY, FLORIDA CRIMINAL DIVISION, CASE NO. 81-17247
STATE OF FLORIDA,PLAINTIFF vs. ALFREDO ARIAS, et al,
DEFENDANTS, PART II, Miami, Florida,
April 5,
1982 DEPOSITION OF RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE
Pamela S. Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest
(Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986)
Antonio de la Cova, “Academic Espionage: US Taxpayer Funding
of a
Pro-Castro Study,” February 1, 1993, The Selous Foundation's
Institute
for
US Cuba Relations
Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Soviet Strategies and Policies in
the
Caribbean Basin," in Wiarda, Howard J. and Mark Falcoff, eds.,
The
Communist Challenge in the Caribbean and Central America
(Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1987), p. 79.
US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985,
1986.
US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986,
October
1987, p. 1, 3, 24-25.
US Departments of State and Defense, The Soviet-Cuban
Connection in
Central America and the Caribbean, March 1985, p. 10.
Bennett, Richard M. Espionage: An Encyclopedia of Spies and
Secrets.
London: Virgin Books, 2002.
Golden, Tim. "White House Wary of Cuba's Little Spy Engine
That Could."
New York Times, January 5, 2003
US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal
Security
Subcommittee, The Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian,
and
Latin American Peoples, 1966.
Maurice Halperin, The Taming of Fidel Castro (Berkeley:
University of
California Press, 1981), p. 189.
J. Michael Waller, “Alive and Kicking,” Insight on the News,
Vol. 18,
February 18, 2002
United States Information Agency, Radio Marti Program, "The
Defection
of A MININT Official," Cuba--Quarterly Situation Report, Third
Quarter
1987, p. V-13.
Radio Martí Program's interview with Major Florentino
Aspillaga
Lombard, August 1987.
Armando Lago, Ph.D.’s “Cuba: The Human Cost of Social
Revolution.”
Also see Lago’s Cuba: Raul Castro Directly Responsible
For 550
Executions, Preliminary draft). Lago’s work can be
accessed at
Maria Werlau’s Free Society Project, Inc website:
http://www.cubaarchive.org/english/research.html.
“Fidel Castro’s Shameful Duplicity: Cuba’s Butcher
Maximus Mourns
‘Culture of Life’ Pope,” April 8, 2005. (Net for Cuba)
Stuart Rochester and Frederick Riley, Honor Bound, American
Prisoners
of War in Southeast Asia 1961-1973. Naval Institute Press,
1999.
US State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2000
released on
April 30, 2001. This is an annual report sent to Congress that
has been
listing Cuba since 1993, see US Cuba Policy Report, April 30,
2001,
page 9.
Eugene Pons, Castro and Terrorism: A Chronology 1959-1967,
Institute
for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies, Occasional Paper
Series,
September 2001;
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/terrorism/castro-terrorism-pons.htm).
Jonathan T. Stride, Who Will Check Out Fidel Castro’s
New
Chemical/Biological Weapons Plant in East Havana?, September
1997
(Miami. www.fiu.edu/-fcf/bio.chem.plnat91097.html)
Stride noted
that the now defunct Voix d’Afrique is said to have published
(2/6/90)
photos of people allegedly deformed by chemical weapons used
by Cuba
against men, women and children in Angola in the 1980’s.
Agustin Blazquez & Jaums Sutton, Castro and International
Terrorism,
September 16, 2001, ABIP
David J. Kopilow, Castro, Israel and the PLO, 1985
Dr. Manuel Cereijo, Castro: A Threat To The Security Of
The
United States, October, 1997.
Roberto Fabricio in El Nuevo Herald, June 20, 1999.
Ernesto F. Betancourt, Executive Summary, Is Castro Preparing
for a
Gotterdammerun?, September 9, 1999.
Betancourt -, The Encephalitis Outbreak, Hussein and Castro: A
CIA/CDC
Cover-Up,
October 18, 1999
The Inter-American Human Rights Commission Report, April 7,
1967
The New Yorker, October 18, 1999, Richard Preston
Hearing Before Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, PEACE CORPS
AND
NARCOTICS AFFAIRS;
CUBA’S
PURSUIT OF
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: FACT
OR FICTION; COMMITTEE
ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE, ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH
CONGRESS;
SECOND Session, June 5, 2002
Mary Anastasia O’Grady,” “Counting Castro's Victims”;
Wall Street
Journal, December 30, 2005
Also see: various reports by Jaime Suchlicki, Director,
Institute for
Cuban and Cuban-American Studies